1. Introduction* The foundations of a mathematical theory of "games of strategy" were laid by John von Neumann between 1928 and 1941. ι The publication in 1944 of the book "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" by von Neumann and Morgenstern climaxed this pioneering effort. The first part of this volume is concerned with games with a finite number of pure strategies with particular emphasis on the "zero-sum two-person" type of game. There it is shown that in most instances a player is at a disadvantage if he always plays the same pure strategy and that it is better to " mix" his pure strategies by some chance device. The starting point of all discussions of this type of game is the celebrated " Main Theorem " or Min-Max Theorem which is concerned with existence and properties of optimal mixed strategies for both players.
The first proofs of this theorem, given by von Neumann, made rather involved use of topology, functional calculus, and fixed point theorems of L. E. J. Brouwer. The first proof of an elementary character was given by J. Ville, 1938 . The von Neumann-Morgenstern book, with the purpose of having a proof which is accessible to a less highly trained group, carries the theme of elementarization further [6] . At this late date there still continues to be a need for a truly elementary proof for example, the recent book of McKinsey on game theory [5] omitted a self-contained proof because none was available.
Kuhn [4] gives a bibliography of some of the better known proofs of the Min-Max Theorem, together with a discussion of their general characteristics which he broadly classifies into (1) those based on separation properties of convex sets and (2) those using some notion of a fixed point of a transformation. Kuhn [4] and McKinsey [5] provide proofs along the lines of von Neumann [6] based on a separation theorem. Dresher [3] gives a self-contained proof along the lines of Ville. As was pointed out in [7] , the Min-Max Theorem is completely algebraic and should be given an algebraic proof. The purely algebraic proofs, when made selfcontained and elementary, appear to be quite long, [3] , [4] , [7] , and, with the exception of WeyPs proof [7] , make use of nonalgebraic concepts as the minimum of a continuous function on a closed bounded set is assumed on the set. All these proofs are either pure existence proofs Received January 15, 1954 and in revised form September 29, 1954 . The author wishes to express his indebtedness to Melvin Dresher for his encouragement and suggestions. 1 For the contributions of Borel to this field see Econometrica, Vol. 21, No. 1, January, 1953, pp. 95-127. 26 G. B. DANTZIG or, from the viewpoint of practical computations, nonconstructive.
The present proof has the following features : It is purely algebraic (in the spirit of Weyl) and elementary in the sense that it used nothing more advanced than the notion of an inverse of a matrix. It is short, self-contained, and noninductive. The very nature of the solution, if desired, could be used to advantage to establish well-known theorems regarding the structure of the class of optimal strategies. It is a special adaptation for games of the simplex method used for solving linear programming problems [I] . 2 As such, it provides perhaps the most efficient means currently available for explicitly constructing optimal mixed strategies for both players.
2 The Min-Max Theorem, It has been found convenient in a part of the proof to compare certain vectors "lexicographically." The term is borrowed from an alphabetical ordering of words (as in a dictionary). Thus a vector A is greater than B (written A> B) if (A-£)> 0 where by (A--B)>0 is meant that (A-B) has nonzero components, the first of which is positive.
Let [(%] be the payoff matrix of a finite zero-sum two-person game where a tJ is the payoff to player I (the maximizing player) when player I plays pure strategy i and player II (the minimizing player) plays pure strategy j. Player I (in order to guard against his strategy being " found out") chooses a mixed strategy (x lf x 2f , x m ) where x t is the probability of playing strategy i accordingly, player Γs expected payoff becomes (Σ Uij χ i) if the minimizing player plays pure strategy j. If player Γs i mixed strategy is found out he can expect that player II will choose j such that Σ a tJ Xi is minimum. Thus, player I wishes to choose his x t such that the smallest such sum (which we will denote by x Q ) is a maximum. For similar reasons player II chooses a mixed strategy y u V i, , 2/« such that the largest sum Σ α «2/j (denoted by y Q ) is minimum. The common value of x 0 and y 0 known as the "value" of the game.
To establish this result we shall consider, as is often done, a related linear inequality problem. Let x t and y ό satisfy the system of relations (1) x^O, (i=l,-",m) ;
If we multiply (3) through by any ^ satisfying (4), (5), and (6) and sum with respect to j similarly multiply through (6) by any x t satisfying (1), (2), (3) and sum with respect to i, one obtains immediately
so that the lower bounds x Q never exceed the upper bounds y 0 . We shall, however, construct a solution x t =^x t and 2^=^ with the property that
In particular (7) 3 Proof of the Min-Max Theorem. We shall begin the proof by augmenting the matrix of the game a tJ and consider the matrix (10)
The columns of this matrix will be denoted P o P 19 , P n ; P n+ι = Ϊ7i, , P n+m =U m where U % are unit vectors with 1 as the (ΐ-f-l)st component. It will be convenient to arrange the rows of the matrix such that (11) α^^maxot!. Let B (which we will call a basis) be a subset of m + 1 columns of (10) (including P o as first column) which, considered as an m-f 1 square matrix, is nonsingular and let the rows of B~ι be denoted by β t (i=0, 1, •• ,m). We shall further require that B, to be a basis, have the property that each row (except i=0) of B~τ have its first nonzero component positive. Thus we are assuming in the lexicographic sense that (11) it follows that b t^> 0 and our special lexicographic assumption (12) . Indeed, for player I, it is easy to verify the condition β 0 P 0 =l is the same as (2); moreover, β Q Pj<L0 for l<Lj<Ln are the same as (3), while for n + l<Lj <Ln + m they are the same as (1) . For player II, the lexicographic property of the rows of B~\ namely βi^>0 for i=l, *' f m implies that the first component of β t (which by definition is jjj) is nonnegative thus, (4) The first of these (m-f-1) linear equations yields (5) since the 1st components of P< are unity for l<Lj t <,n and zero otherwise. The remaining m equations yield the inequalities (6) if the terms involving j t > n are dropped (the latter are nonnegative because y^ I> 0 and their coefficients are the components of the unit vectors P n+i ).
Finally, the proof is completed by noting that (8) or x d =y 0 holds since both are defined in (16) and (17) as the (0, 0) element of B~\ Constructing an Optimal Basis. It is clear now that the central problem is one of constructing a basis B with the property that β Q P 3 < Q for j=l, 2, ,n + m since this in turn yields an optimal mixed strategy for each player. We shall show that if some basis B, such as B Q , does not have the requisite property (15), then it is easy to construct from B a new basis S* which differs from B by only one column where 0-row of [i?*]" 1 (which we denote by βt) has the property that
that is, the first nonzero component of (β Q -β^) is positive. If the new basis 5* does not satisfy (15) then the algorithm just outlined for B is iterated, with B replaced by Z?*, etc. This process generates a sequence of bases which terminates when a basis is obtained that has the required property. This must occur in a finite number of steps since the condition (18) is a strict inequality which insures that no basis can be repeated and the number of different bases cannot exceed the number of ways of choosing m columns out of n + m from (10).
3
The 0-column of successive bases of the iterative process may be interpreted as a succession of improved mixed strategies for player II for which his expected loss, y 0 , if his opponent is playing optimally, is decreasing to a minimum. Indeed, the components of the first column of any basis (as in (17) and sequel) satisfy (4) and (5) independently of condition (15), while y Q , the first component of β Q , is nonincreasing from basis to basis by virtue of (18). To construct B* from B let P s denote the column of (10) which replaces the rth column of B where P s and P Jr are determined by the following rules: Choose P s such that 
where ΐ, rφQ, and where it is assumed for the moment that there is at least one ^>0. The minimizing vector is easily obtained in practice by finding the vector whose first component is the least if there is a tie, then one passes to the second components of the tying vectors and selects the least, etc. A relation which will be used later that follows from (21) is (22) ft-UL/3 r >o (*i>0). v r It is clear from the structure of the augmented matrix (10) that the first column P o can not be formed as a positive linear combination of the other columns Pj. However, if we assume, contrary to the assumption of (21), that all v t <L0, (iφO) and write then, by transposing to the left all terms other than v 0 P Q , we obtain a positive linear combination of columns P s and P Jt that yields v Q P Q , where v 0 y>0; a contradiction.
There remains only to show that B* has the requisite properties (12) Initial Iteration. The initial basis, B=B Q , consists of P o , P 2 , P 7 =U U P S =U 2 . The inverse of S o (given below) is determined by formula (13). The entries v t shown, for the moment, cannot be filled in until P s is first determined. 
